Abstract. There is a debate regarding the impact of swing or independent voters in American politics. While some argue that swing voters either do not swing or have a marginal impact on campaigns, the decline in voter partisan identification and the rise of independents means that they have a potential impact on elections, making them a desirable commodity to candidates. Additionally, presidential elections represent a unique case for swing voters. A robust literature notes that during the presidential primary and caucus process, voters in states such as Iowa or New Hampshire effectively have a greater voice in the election than those in other states. This is due to the number of voters in these states, and the strategic importance of having their primaries and caucuses positioned at the beginning of the presidential selection process. Additionally, the Electoral College is criticized as giving disproportionate influence to some voters or states, or as otherwise distorting the results in presidential elections because of its winner-take-all method of allocating votes in 48 or the 50 states. But these assertions notwithstanding, can the impact or distortion that swing-voters have in some states compared to others, in terms of their relative influence on presidential elections, be quantified? Relatedly, does the Electoral College distort the impact of swing voters? This study presents a new method to assess the impact of swing voters within the winner-take-all method that states use to allocate electoral votes. By looking at several recent U.S. presidential elections, we quantify how the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes produces disparities in the voting power of citizens across states.
Introduction
In the U.S., voting is a fundamental right characterized, at least in theory, by the requirement of all votes carrying "equal weight." This concept is perhaps best expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court, in reapportionment decisions that followed the well-known "one person, one vote" philosophy. This precedent demands nearly mathematical equality in the apportionment of congressional districts and in the requirement that the counting of votes assigns equal weight to each voter across a state. Moreover, as it became clear in the Bush v. Gore Supreme Court decision of 2000, voters in one part of the state would not face a standard for the counting of their votes that differed from that in other parts of the state. In other words, geography would not impact voting power and hence not interfere with voting rights.
Despite the equal weight imperative, as a practical matter, some votes do count more than others. There is a debate regarding the impact of swing or independent voters in American politics (Campbell, 2008; Shaw, 2008) . While some argue that swing voters either do not swing or have a marginal impact on campaigns, the decline in voter partisan identification and the rise of independents means that they have a potential impact on elections, making them a desirable commodity to candidates (Pomper, 1975; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Campbell, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 2008) . Additionally, presidential elections represent a unique case for swing voters. A robust literature notes that during the presidential primary and caucus process, voters in states such as Iowa or New Hampshire effectively have a greater voice in the election than those in other states (Schier, 1980; Bartles, 1989; Brady, 1989; Mixon and Hobson, 2001; Mayer and Busch, 2004; Hull, 2008) . This is due to the number of voters in these states, and the strategic importance of having their primaries and caucuses positioned at the beginning of the presidential selection process. Additionally, the Electoral College is criticized as giving disproportionate influence to some voters or states, or as otherwise distorting the results in presidential elections because of its winner-take-all method of allocating votes in 48 or the 50 states (Pomper, 2001: 150) . But these assertions notwithstanding, can the impact or distortion that swing-voters have in some states compared to others, in terms of their relative influence on presidential elections, be quantified? Relatedly, does the Electoral College distort the impact of swing voters? This study presents a new method to assess the impact of swing voters within the winner-take-all method that states use to allocate electoral votes. By looking at several recent U.S. presidential elections, we quantify how the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes produces disparities in the voting power of citizens across states.
Presidential Elections and the Electoral College
The U.S. Electoral College is perhaps one of the oddest institutions in American politics. For those who teach it to undergraduates, it is often the subject of significant confusion, leaving students to wonder why it even exists. The framers of the Constitution defended it as critical to producing "extraordinary persons" as presidents because they would be selected by "men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station" of the presidency (Madison, 1937: 444) .
Others, such as Martin Diamond, have justified it as a constitutional system meant to protect individual and minority rights, or as a mechanism to overcome regionalism (Diamond, 1959: 52) . In Diamond's view, it, along with the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances, was necessary to thwart the dangers of factionalism that a popular government posed.
Others have noted that, with an Electoral College, recounts would not need to be done nationally, but only in specific jurisdictions where there were disputes (Posner, 2001: 224-227) .
The Electoral College has also had its detractors. It has been criticized as anti-democratic, as denying individual liberty and the fundamental right to vote, and as no longer serving the purpose for which it was established (Glennon, 1992) . Following the 2000 presidential electionwhere George Bush lost the national popular vote to Al Gore but won the Electoral College vote-those criticisms intensified (Bugliosi, 2001; Dershowitz, 2001) . Others maintain that the Electoral College serves to depress and/or distort voter turnout (Keyssar, 2006; Cebula, 2002) or that it creates a system of wasted votes (Cebula and Meads, 2008; Edwards, 2004) . Still others see the Electoral College as discouraging the formation and support of third parties (Durban, 1992) .
A further criticism of the Electoral College derives less from its constitutional design than from the practice of all states, except for Maine and Nebraska, to award all of their electoral votes to the presidential candidate receiving the plurality of the popular vote in their state (Greene, 2001: 25; Posner, 2001: 239; Pomper, 2001: 150 (Banzhaf, 1968 Constitution. The U.S. Constitution provides that each state's electors shall be appointed in a manner to be determined by its legislature. The only stipulation is that a sitting member of Congress cannot also serve as an elector.
Given that the U.S. Constitution leaves the determination of how electors are appointed to the state legislatures, it is not surprising that they have all (with the exception of Maine and Nebraska) opted for a winner-take-all allocation in order to maximize their influence. At the state level, such a course of action is a rational one. Allocating its electors on a winner-take-all basis boosts the likelihood that candidates will visit a state and pay attention to its concerns. If, for example, Oregon, with its relatively small population is shaping up as a swing state, a lastminute trip to the state might appear attractive. If it went well, it could have the effect of swinging the full complement of the state's Electoral College votes on election day. Candidates would be less likely to court the state's voters if the state's Electoral College votes were allocated on some other basis. The result is that every state, clamoring for national candidates' attention, ends up with a winner-take-all allocation.
While Mayhew (2010: 196-198) contends there is no partisan bias to the Electoral College, there is some evidence that it does distort election results (Cebula and Meads, 2008) . winner-take-all allocation of each state's Electoral College votes ensures that it will happen in every election. Under winner-take-all, some states' votes will count for more than others -in some cases, hundreds or even thousands of times more -in determining the outcome. It happens whether the election is a cliffhanger or a landslide. The only difference, then, from one election to the next is its magnitude.
Since then there has been a movement started -the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact -to effectively alter the Electoral College. This proposal, in lieu of a constitutional amendment, would require a state to allocate its electoral votes according to whoever is the winner in the national popular vote for president. The animus behind this proposal is not only to make the popular vote more directly determinative in presidential elections, but also to address the other perceived distortions or problems (such as reduced or distorted voter participation rates) associated with the institution, at least given the current winner-take-all system for allocating electoral votes.
3. Winner-Take-All Distortions: A Statistical Analysis
As noted, the winner-take-all method to allocate electoral votes distorts presidential elections. impact. The election's outcome in both states was treated as almost a foregone conclusion, and they received hardly any attention from the candidates other than for fund-raising purposes. 
Swing States and Fiscal Federalism: Some Empirical Tests
Empirical studies making use of the distortions in the Electoral College system are not new. Wright's (1974) (Tollison, 2004: 558) ." Grier, McDonald and Tollison (1995) show, using a pooled sample (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) The Electoral College distortion explored above, which creates asymmetries in the impact of a swing vote across the 50 states, carries with it public choice implications regarding fiscal federalism. Mixon and Hobson (2001) show that intergovernmental grants -from the federal level to the states -are sensitive to the presidential primaries/caucuses calendar during each presidential election cycle. As Mixon and Hobson (2001) indicate, by rearranging (or frontloading) the dates of their primaries and caucuses, states can play a more important role in shaping the field of presidential candidates within the two major U.S. political parties.
Specifically, results in Mixon and Hobson (2001) suggest that a 10.36 days movement (closer to 1 January) of a state's primary or caucus results in an increase of $181 million to $600 million per presidential election year in federal grants to state governments.
In an earlier, yet related study, Mixon and Ladner (1998) apply the public choice model of Tullock (1967) , Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) to events surrounding the 1995 Republican takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives. As part of the Republican campaign platform of 1994, many candidates adopted the "Contract with America," which promised to reinforce adherence to the 10 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by sending various fiscal responsibilities, often accompanied by federal receipts, back to the 50 states. 4 As Mixon and Ladner (1998: 31) posit, as the federal government bundles tax receipts in the form of block grants for states, the value of holding state office would increase, thereby enticing a larger pool of candidates for those offices. Event study results from the panel data set employed by Mixon and Ladner (1998) suggest that the block grant movement that occurred after the Republican victory in 1994 led to a significant increase in the number of candidates for state house seats.
Based on the studies reviewed above, the empirical model expressed in equation (1) is proposed as a test of the impact of the importance of swing states' votes in the presidential election:
In the model above, the subscript, t, represents a presidential election year; in this study, t is 
